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supplement efforts to define and catalog Transport Services by describing the interfaces required
to add security protocols. This survey is not limited to protocols developed within the scope or
context of the IETF, and those included represent a superset of features a Transport Services
system may need to support.
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1. Introduction 
Services and features provided by transport protocols have been cataloged in . This
document supplements that work by surveying commonly used and notable network security
protocols, and identifying the interfaces between these protocols and both transport protocols
and applications. It examines Transport Layer Security (TLS), Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS), IETF QUIC, Google QUIC (gQUIC), tcpcrypt, Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Secure Real-
time Transport Protocol (SRTP) with DTLS, WireGuard, CurveCP, and MinimaLT. For each
protocol, this document provides a brief description. Then, it describes the interfaces between
these protocols and transports in Section 4 and the interfaces between these protocols and
applications in Section 5.
A Transport Services system exposes an interface for applications to access various (secure)
transport protocol features. The security protocols included in this survey represent a superset of
functionality and features a Transport Services system may need to support both internally and
externally (via an API) for applications . Ubiquitous IETF protocols such as (D)TLS,
as well as non-standard protocols such as gQUIC, are included despite overlapping features. As
such, this survey is not limited to protocols developed within the scope or context of the IETF.
Outside of this candidate set, protocols that do not offer new features are omitted. For example,
newer protocols such as WireGuard make unique design choices that have implications for and
limitations on application usage. In contrast, protocols such as secure shell (SSH) , GRE 
, the Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) , and Application Layer Transport
Security (ALTS)  are omitted since they do not provide interfaces deemed unique.
[RFC8095]
[TAPS-ARCH]
[RFC4253]
[RFC2890] [RFC5641]
[ALTS]
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Authentication-only protocols such as the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)  and the
IPsec Authentication Header (AH)  are excluded from this survey. TCP-AO adds
authentication to long-lived TCP connections, e.g., replay protection with per-packet Message
Authentication Codes. (TCP-AO obsoletes TCP MD5 "signature" options specified in .)
One primary use case of TCP-AO is for protecting BGP connections. Similarly, AH adds per-
datagram authentication and integrity, along with replay protection. Despite these
improvements, neither protocol sees general use and both lack critical properties important for
emergent transport security protocols, such as confidentiality and privacy protections. Such
protocols are thus omitted from this survey.
This document only surveys point-to-point protocols; multicast protocols are out of scope.
[RFC5925]
[RFC4302]
[RFC2385]
1.1. Goals 
This survey is intended to help identify the most common interface surfaces between security
protocols and transport protocols, and between security protocols and applications.
One of the goals of the Transport Services effort is to define a common interface for using
transport protocols that allows software using transport protocols to easily adopt new protocols
that provide similar feature sets. The survey of the dependencies security protocols have upon
transport protocols can guide implementations in determining which transport protocols are
appropriate to be able to use beneath a given security protocol. For example, a security protocol
that expects to run over a reliable stream of bytes, like TLS, restricts the set of transport protocols
that can be used to those that offer a reliable stream of bytes.
Defining the common interfaces that security protocols provide to applications also allows
interfaces to be designed in a way that common functionality can use the same APIs. For
example, many security protocols that provide authentication let the application be involved in
peer identity validation. Any interface to use a secure transport protocol stack thus needs to
allow applications to perform this action during connection establishment.
1.2. Non-goals 
While this survey provides similar analysis to that which was performed for transport protocols
in , it is important to distinguish that the use of security protocols requires more
consideration.
It is not a goal to allow software implementations to automatically switch between different
security protocols, even where their interfaces to transport and applications are equivalent. Even
between versions, security protocols have subtly different guarantees and vulnerabilities. Thus,
any implementation needs to only use the set of protocols and algorithms that are requested by
applications or by a system policy.
Different security protocols also can use incompatible notions of peer identity and
authentication, and cryptographic options. It is not a goal to identify a common set of
representations for these concepts.
[RFC8095]
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The protocols surveyed in this document represent a superset of functionality and features a
Transport Services system may need to support. It does not list all transport protocols that a
Transport Services system may need to implement, nor does it mandate that a Transport Service
system implement any particular protocol.
A Transport Services system may implement any secure transport protocol that provides the
described features. In doing so, it may need to expose an interface to the application to configure
these features.
Transport Feature:
Transport Service:
Transport Services system:
Transport Protocol:
Application:
Security Protocol:
Handshake Protocol:
Record:
Record Protocol:
Session:
Connection:
2. Terminology 
The following terms are used throughout this document to describe the roles and interactions of
transport security protocols (some of which are also defined in ):
a specific end-to-end feature that the transport layer provides to an
application. Examples include confidentiality, reliable delivery, ordered delivery, and
message-versus-stream orientation. 
a set of Transport Features, without an association to any given framing
protocol, that provides functionality to an application. 
a software component that exposes an interface to different
Transport Services to an application. 
an implementation that provides one or more different Transport Services
using a specific framing and header format on the wire. A Transport Protocol services an
application, whether directly or in conjunction with a security protocol. 
an entity that uses a transport protocol for end-to-end delivery of data across the
network. This may also be an upper layer protocol or tunnel encapsulation. 
a defined network protocol that implements one or more security features,
such as authentication, encryption, key generation, session resumption, and privacy. Security
protocols may be used alongside transport protocols, and in combination with other security
protocols when appropriate. 
a protocol that enables peers to validate each other and to securely
establish shared cryptographic context. 
framed protocol messages. 
a security protocol that allows data to be divided into manageable blocks and
protected using shared cryptographic context. 
an ephemeral security association between applications. 
the shared state of two or more endpoints that persists across messages that are
transmitted between these endpoints. A connection is a transient participant of a session, and
a session generally lasts between connection instances. 
[RFC8095]
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Peer:
Client:
Server:
an endpoint application party to a session. 
the peer responsible for initiating a session. 
the peer responsible for responding to a session initiation. 
3. Transport Security Protocol Descriptions 
This section contains brief transport and security descriptions of various security protocols
currently used to protect data being sent over a network. These protocols are grouped based on
where in the protocol stack they are implemented, which influences which parts of a packet they
protect: Generic application payload, application payload for specific application-layer protocols,
both application payload and transport headers, or entire IP packets.
Note that not all security protocols can be easily categorized, e.g., as some protocols can be used
in different ways or in combination with other protocols. One major reason for this is that
channel security protocols often consist of two components:
A handshake protocol, which is responsible for negotiating parameters, authenticating the
endpoints, and establishing shared keys. 
A record protocol, which is used to encrypt traffic using keys and parameters provided by
the handshake protocol. 
For some protocols, such as tcpcrypt, these two components are tightly integrated. In contrast, for
IPsec, these components are implemented in separate protocols: AH and the Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) are record protocols, which can use keys supplied by the handshake
protocol Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), by other handshake protocols, or by
manual configuration. Moreover, some protocols can be used in different ways: While the base
TLS protocol as defined in  has an integrated handshake and record protocol, TLS or
DTLS can also be used to negotiate keys for other protocols, as in DTLS-SRTP, or the handshake
protocol can be used with a separate record layer, as in QUIC .
• 
• 
[RFC8446]
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]
3.1. Application Payload Security Protocols 
The following protocols provide security that protects application payloads sent over a transport.
They do not specifically protect any headers used for transport-layer functionality.
3.1.1. TLS 
TLS (Transport Layer Security)  is a common protocol used to establish a secure session
between two endpoints. Communication over this session prevents "eavesdropping, tampering,
and message forgery." TLS consists of a tightly coupled handshake and record protocol. The
handshake protocol is used to authenticate peers, negotiate protocol options such as
cryptographic algorithms, and derive session-specific keying material. The record protocol is
used to marshal and, once the handshake has sufficiently progressed, encrypt data from one peer
to the other. This data may contain handshake messages or raw application data.
[RFC8446]
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3.1.2. DTLS 
DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security)   is based on TLS, but differs in
that it is designed to run over unreliable datagram protocols like UDP instead of TCP. DTLS
modifies the protocol to make sure it can still provide equivalent security guarantees to TLS with
the exception of order protection/non-replayability. DTLS was designed to be as similar to TLS as
possible, so this document assumes that all properties from TLS are carried over except where
specified.
[RFC6347] [DTLS-1.3]
3.2. Application-Specific Security Protocols 
The following protocols provide application-specific security by protecting application payloads
used for specific use cases. Unlike the protocols above, these are not intended for generic
application use.
3.2.1. Secure RTP 
Secure RTP (SRTP) is a profile for RTP that provides confidentiality, message authentication, and
replay protection for RTP data packets and RTP control protocol (RTCP) packets . SRTP
provides a record layer only, and requires a separate handshake protocol to provide key
agreement and identity management.
The commonly used handshake protocol for SRTP is DTLS, in the form of DTLS-SRTP .
This is an extension to DTLS that negotiates the use of SRTP as the record layer and describes
how to export keys for use with SRTP.
ZRTP  is an alternative key agreement and identity management protocol for SRTP.
ZRTP Key agreement is performed using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange that runs on the media
path. This generates a shared secret that is then used to generate the master key and salt for
SRTP.
[RFC3711]
[RFC5764]
[RFC6189]
3.3. Transport-Layer Security Protocols 
The following security protocols provide protection for both application payloads and headers
that are used for Transport Services.
3.3.1. IETF QUIC 
QUIC is a new standards-track transport protocol that runs over UDP, loosely based on Google's
original proprietary gQUIC protocol  (See Section 3.3.2 for more details). The
QUIC transport layer itself provides support for data confidentiality and integrity. This requires
keys to be derived with a separate handshake protocol. A mapping for QUIC of TLS 1.3 
 has been specified to provide this handshake.
[QUIC-TRANSPORT]
[QUIC-
TLS]
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3.3.2. Google QUIC 
Google QUIC (gQUIC) is a UDP-based multiplexed streaming protocol designed and deployed by
Google following experience from deploying SPDY, the proprietary predecessor to HTTP/2. gQUIC
was originally known as "QUIC"; this document uses gQUIC to unambiguously distinguish it from
the standards-track IETF QUIC. The proprietary technical forebear of IETF QUIC, gQUIC was
originally designed with tightly integrated security and application data transport protocols.
3.3.3. tcpcrypt 
Tcpcrypt  is a lightweight extension to the TCP protocol for opportunistic encryption.
Applications may use tcpcrypt's unique session ID for further application-level authentication.
Absent this authentication, tcpcrypt is vulnerable to active attacks.
[RFC8548]
3.3.4. MinimaLT 
MinimaLT  is a UDP-based transport security protocol designed to offer
confidentiality, mutual authentication, DoS prevention, and connection mobility. One major goal
of the protocol is to leverage existing protocols to obtain server-side configuration information
used to more quickly bootstrap a connection. MinimaLT uses a variant of TCP's congestion
control algorithm.
[MinimaLT]
3.3.5. CurveCP 
CurveCP  is a UDP-based transport security that, unlike many other security protocols,
is based entirely upon public key algorithms. CurveCP provides its own reliability for application
data as part of its protocol.
[CurveCP]
3.4. Packet Security Protocols 
The following protocols provide protection for IP packets. These are generally used as tunnels,
such as for Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Often, applications will not interact directly with
these protocols. However, applications that implement tunnels will interact directly with these
protocols.
3.4.1. IPsec 
IKEv2  and ESP  together form the modern IPsec protocol suite that encrypts
and authenticates IP packets, either for creating tunnels (tunnel-mode) or for direct transport
connections (transport-mode). This suite of protocols separates out the key generation protocol
(IKEv2) from the transport encryption protocol (ESP). Each protocol can be used independently,
but this document considers them together, since that is the most common pattern.
[RFC7296] [RFC4303]
3.4.2. WireGuard 
WireGuard  is an IP-layer protocol designed as an alternative to IPsec for certain use
cases. It uses UDP to encapsulate IP datagrams between peers. Unlike most transport security
protocols, which rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for peer authentication, WireGuard
[WireGuard]
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authenticates peers using pre-shared public keys delivered out of band, each of which is bound
to one or more IP addresses. Moreover, as a protocol suited for VPNs, WireGuard offers no
extensibility, negotiation, or cryptographic agility.
3.4.3. OpenVPN 
OpenVPN  is a commonly used protocol designed as an alternative to IPsec. A major
goal of this protocol is to provide a VPN that is simple to configure and works over a variety of
transports. OpenVPN encapsulates either IP packets or Ethernet frames within a secure tunnel
and can run over either UDP or TCP. For key establishment, OpenVPN can either use TLS as a
handshake protocol or use pre-shared keys.
[OpenVPN]
4. Transport Dependencies 
Across the different security protocols listed above, the primary dependency on transport
protocols is the presentation of data: either an unbounded stream of bytes, or framed messages.
Within protocols that rely on the transport for message framing, most are built to run over
transports that inherently provide framing, like UDP, but some also define how their messages
can be framed over byte-stream transports.
4.1. Reliable Byte-Stream Transports 
The following protocols all depend upon running on a transport protocol that provides a reliable,
in-order stream of bytes. This is typically TCP.
Application Payload Security Protocols:
TLS 
Transport-Layer Security Protocols:
tcpcrypt 
• 
• 
4.2. Unreliable Datagram Transports 
The following protocols all depend on the transport protocol to provide message framing to
encapsulate their data. These protocols are built to run using UDP, and thus do not have any
requirement for reliability. Running these protocols over a protocol that does provide reliability
will not break functionality but may lead to multiple layers of reliability if the security protocol
is encapsulating other transport protocol traffic.
Application Payload Security Protocols:
DTLS 
ZRTP 
SRTP 
• 
• 
• 
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Transport-Layer Security Protocols:
QUIC 
MinimaLT 
CurveCP 
Packet Security Protocols:
IPsec 
WireGuard 
OpenVPN 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
4.2.1. Datagram Protocols with Defined Byte-Stream Mappings 
Of the protocols listed above that depend on the transport for message framing, some do have
well-defined mappings for sending their messages over byte-stream transports like TCP.
Application Payload Security Protocols:
DTLS when used as a handshake protocol for SRTP  
ZRTP  
SRTP  
Packet Security Protocols:
IPsec  
• [RFC7850]
• [RFC6189]
• [RFC4571][RFC3711]
• [RFC8229]
4.3. Transport-Specific Dependencies 
One protocol surveyed, tcpcrypt, has a direct dependency on a feature in the transport that is
needed for its functionality. Specifically, tcpcrypt is designed to run on top of TCP and uses the
TCP Encryption Negotiation Option (TCP-ENO)  to negotiate its protocol support.
QUIC, CurveCP, and MinimaLT provide both transport functionality and security functionality.
They depend on running over a framed protocol like UDP, but they add their own layers of
reliability and other Transport Services. Thus, an application that uses one of these protocols
cannot decouple the security from transport functionality.
[RFC8547]
5. Application Interface 
This section describes the interface exposed by the security protocols described above. We
partition these interfaces into pre-connection (configuration), connection, and post-connection
interfaces, following conventions in  and .
Note that not all protocols support each interface. The table in Section 5.4 summarizes which
protocol exposes which of the interfaces. In the following sections, we provide abbreviations of
the interface names to use in the summary table.
[TAPS-INTERFACE] [TAPS-ARCH]
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Identities and Private Keys (IPK):
Supported Algorithms (Key Exchange, Signatures, and Ciphersuites) (ALG):
Extensions (EXT):
Session Cache Management (CM):
5.1. Pre-connection Interfaces 
Configuration interfaces are used to configure the security protocols before a handshake begins
or keys are negotiated.
The application can provide its identity, credentials (e.g.,
certificates), and private keys, or mechanisms to access these, to the security protocol to use
during handshakes.
TLS 
DTLS 
ZRTP 
QUIC 
MinimaLT 
CurveCP 
IPsec 
WireGuard 
OpenVPN 
The application can
choose the algorithms that are supported for key exchange, signatures, and ciphersuites.
TLS 
DTLS 
ZRTP 
QUIC 
tcpcrypt 
MinimaLT 
IPsec 
OpenVPN 
The application enables or configures extensions that are to be negotiated by
the security protocol, such as Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) .
TLS 
DTLS 
QUIC 
The application provides the ability to save and retrieve
session state (such as tickets, keying material, and server parameters) that may be used to
resume the security session.
TLS 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
[RFC7301]
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Authentication Delegation (AD):
Pre-Shared Key Import (PSKI):
DTLS 
ZRTP 
QUIC 
tcpcrypt 
MinimaLT 
The application provides access to a separate module that will
provide authentication, using the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)  for
example.
IPsec 
tcpcrypt 
Either the handshake protocol or the application directly can
supply pre-shared keys for use in encrypting (and authenticating) communication with a
peer.
TLS 
DTLS 
ZRTP 
QUIC 
tcpcrypt 
MinimaLT 
IPsec 
WireGuard 
OpenVPN 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
[RFC3748]
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Identity Validation (IV):
5.2. Connection Interfaces 
During a handshake, the security protocol will conduct identity
validation of the peer. This can offload validation or occur transparently to the application.
TLS 
DTLS 
ZRTP 
QUIC 
MinimaLT 
CurveCP 
IPsec 
WireGuard 
OpenVPN 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Source Address Validation (SAV): The handshake protocol may interact with the transport
protocol or application to validate the address of the remote peer that has sent data. This
involves sending a cookie exchange to avoid DoS attacks. (This list omits protocols that
depend on TCP and therefore implicitly perform SAV.)
DTLS 
QUIC 
IPsec 
WireGuard 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Connection Termination (CT):
Key Update (KU):
Shared Secret Key Export (SSKE):
5.3. Post-connection Interfaces 
The security protocol may be instructed to tear down its
connection and session information. This is needed by some protocols, e.g., to prevent
application data truncation attacks in which an attacker terminates an underlying insecure
connection-oriented protocol to terminate the session.
TLS 
DTLS 
ZRTP 
QUIC 
tcpcrypt 
MinimaLT 
IPsec 
OpenVPN 
The handshake protocol may be instructed to update its keying material,
either by the application directly or by the record protocol sending a key expiration event.
TLS 
DTLS 
QUIC 
tcpcrypt 
MinimaLT 
IPsec 
The handshake protocol may provide an interface for
producing shared secrets for application-specific uses.
TLS 
DTLS 
tcpcrypt 
IPsec 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Key Expiration (KE):
Mobility Events (ME):
OpenVPN 
MinimaLT 
The record protocol can signal that its keys are expiring due to reaching a
time-based deadline or a use-based deadline (number of bytes that have been encrypted with
the key). This interaction is often limited to signaling between the record layer and the
handshake layer.
IPsec 
The record protocol can be signaled that it is being migrated to another
transport or interface due to connection mobility, which may reset address and state
validation and induce state changes such as use of a new Connection Identifier (CID).
DTLS (version 1.3 only ) 
QUIC 
MinimaLT 
CurveCP 
IPsec  
WireGuard 
• 
• 
• 
• [DTLS-1.3]
• 
• 
• 
• [RFC4555]
• 
5.4. Summary of Interfaces Exposed by Protocols 
The following table summarizes which protocol exposes which interface.
Protocol IPK ALG EXT CM AD PSKI IV SAV CT KU SSKE KE ME
TLS x x x x  x x  x x x   
DTLS x x x x  x x x x x x  x
ZRTP x x  x  x x  x     
QUIC x x x x  x x x x x   x
tcpcrypt  x  x x x   x x x   
MinimaLT x x  x  x x  x x x  x
CurveCP x      x      x
IPsec x x   x x x x x x x x x
WireGuard x     x x x     x
OpenVPN x x    x x  x  x   
Table 1
RFC 8922 Transport Security Survey October 2020
Enghardt, et al. Informational Page 14
[ALTS]
[CurveCP]
[DTLS-1.3]
[MinimaLT]
[OpenVPN]
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6. IANA Considerations 
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7. Security Considerations 
This document summarizes existing transport security protocols and their interfaces. It does not
propose changes to or recommend usage of reference protocols. Moreover, no claims of security
and privacy properties beyond those guaranteed by the protocols discussed are made. For
example, metadata leakage via timing side channels and traffic analysis may compromise any
protocol discussed in this survey. Applications using Security Interfaces should take such
limitations into consideration when using a particular protocol implementation.
8. Privacy Considerations 
Analysis of how features improve or degrade privacy is intentionally omitted from this survey.
All security protocols surveyed generally improve privacy by using encryption to reduce
information leakage. However, varying amounts of metadata remain in the clear across each
protocol. For example, client and server certificates are sent in cleartext in TLS 1.2 ,
whereas they are encrypted in TLS 1.3 . A survey of privacy features, or lack thereof,
for various security protocols could be addressed in a separate document.
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